




Addressing unrealistic optimism with counterfactual reasoning in an employability 
module in higher education. 
Abstract 
Previous research has illustrated that people are unrealistically optimistic in regard to the 
outcomes of tasks or events related to their own personal futures. This paper examines 
unrealistic optimism about assessment performance by students on an employability module 
and the application of counterfactual reasoning to improve predictive accuracy and improve 
student performance and attainment. Using an experimental design, the study compared the 
module performance of those who generated reasons why they would and would not achieve a 
series of specific grades. A control group who did not generate any reasons also took part. It 
was found that generating reasons why they might not achieve a high grade on the module 
assessment reduced unrealistic optimism and increased assessment performance compared to 
the control group. The findings are considered in relation to the theory of possible selves and 
the possibility of applying this technique in wider educational settings to improve student 
performance and attainment. 
Introduction 
This paper examines whether students who engage in counterfactual reasoning about predicted 
grades on an employability module can improve their performance and attainment. A key 
component of most, if not all, degrees in the U.K today is the development of the student’s 
employability so that they can delineate the best potential career pathway and develop the skills 
to navigate this effectively. Often this is done through modules within programmes, the grades 
for which count towards the final degree, thus employability modules serve two beneficial 
functions for students: firstly, they support the development of vital awareness, knowledge and 





to overall degree classification. Such outcomes are also beneficial to the university which is 
assessed on the degree classifications and destinations of its graduates. 
This paper considers one approach to mitigating a problem which has been observed in Hanson 
and Lees (2012), Tomlinson (2007) and Jerrim (2007) which is that some undergraduate 
students continue to over-estimate their employability and future prospects. They demonstrate 
what has been referred to as ‘unrealistic optimism’ (e.g. Hoch, 1985; Coelho, 2010), which is 
an unrealistic cognition (cognitions are aspects of thought concerned with processing 
information and directing behaviour). Unrealistic cognitions regarding personal futures are 
unlikely to be helpful in the long term - research has demonstrated the negative consequences 
for students who hold unrealistic cognitions which include reduced retention (e.g. Charlton, 
Barrow & Hornby-Atkinson, 2006; Lowe & Cook, 2003) and poorer attainment (Nicholson, 
Putwain, Connors & Hornby-Atkinson, 2013). Neither of these outcomes are advantageous for 
the student, nor indeed the university, and so it seems fruitful to investigate approaches to 
shifting cognitions from unrealistic to realistic with a view to improving performance and 
attainment on an employability module. This should mean that students experience two 
beneficial outcomes: improved employability through producing a better standard of portfolio 
assessment (which requires multiple employability skills) and higher attainment which 
contributes to their overall degree classification. 
Literature Review 
Exploring student experience and performance in Higher Education (HE) from an educational 
sociological perspective has been popular over the last two decades. Research examining the 
role of structural inequalities has  demonstrated the importance of ethnicity and race (e.g. 
Richardson, 2008; Ianelli & Huang, 2014; Wallace, 2016; Sardone, 2018), age and gender (e.g. 





(Bathmaker, et al., 2016; Reay, 2018), school and socio-demographics (e.g. Thiele, Singleton, 
Pope & Stanistreet, 2014) and disability (e.g. Richardson, 2009) in performance. The social 
structures which underpin inequity in employability and performance continue to exert a 
significant influence – often these social structures are examined through the forms of capital, 
introduced by Bourdieu (2004), and extensions of this conceptual tool from Tomlinson (2017). 
However, individual agency and the way in which it may interact with social structures, is a 
key driver influencing practice. Individual agency, arguably, is more readily amenable to short-
term intervention. This paper consequently adopts an educational psychology approach to the 
issue of student’s performance in HE, whilst it acknowledges the importance of social 
structures on individuals, it also recognises that this approach does not always adequately 
consider the agent themselves and instead risks “central conflation” (cf.Archer, 1996; Baker, 
2019).  This paper concerns itself with individual level metacognitive, cognitive and 
motivational variables that are related to expectations, confidence and optimism. In particular, 
it considers the phenomenon of unrealistic optimism which can occur when individuals attempt 
to predict outcomes in their personal future and whether counterfactual reasoning can correct 
this. Acting as a proxy for future attitudes toward the graduate labour market, this paper 
examines undergraduate performance on an employability module, specifically, it examines 
the ability of employing counterfactual reasoning to improve student performance and 
attainment on an employability module assessment. 
Unrealistic metacognition and cognition 
Whilst cognition is a term which encompasses all aspects of thought concerned with processing 
information and directing behaviour, metacognition essentially refers to the act of thinking 
about thinking – it is defined as “any knowledge or cognitive process that is involved in the 
appraisal, monitoring or control of cognition (Niemeyer, Moritz & Pietrosky, 2013, pp. 119) 





own cognition (for example awareness of comprehension) and knowledge of oneself as a 
learner (for example effective strategies for your learning) (Lai, 2011). The development of the 
capacity for metacognition is considered important for learning (e.g. Jans & Leclerq, 1997) but 
is subject to individual differences in accuracy (e.g. Kelemen, Frost & Weaver, 2000). 
Metacognitive inaccuracy can occur in two main ways: through calibration and through 
resolution (Koriat, 2007). Resolution refers to an individual’s ability to discriminate between 
aspects of a task that will be more, or less, difficult. Calibration refers to the actual accuracy of 
metacognitive judgements about performance and the performance on a task itself. It can reveal 
if an individual has an overconfidence bias or an under-confidence bias. This bias in predicting 
our performance on tasks is now explored in more detail. 
Unrealistic Optimism 
Coelho (2010) in their research examining unrealistic optimism demonstrated that people are 
unable to make accurate predictions about their ability on tasks or events related to their own 
personal futures. Furthermore, individuals will maintain both unrealistic confidence and 
unrealistic optimism in their judgements even when they do not achieve predicted outcomes 
(e.g. Hoch, 1985; Coelho, 2010). Unrealistic confidence and unrealistic optimism are similar 
in that they both involve making metacognitive judgements about outcomes. However, whilst 
unrealistic confidence is ‘an unfounded excessive precision in forecasting’ (Coelho, 2010, 
p.399) it is distinct from unrealistic optimism; ‘an underestimation of the likelihood of 
experiencing negative events and an overestimation of the probability of experiencing positive 
events’ (Coelho, 2010, p.399), where subjective and objective probabilities diverge. It is 
unrealistic optimism which is the focus of this paper.  
Weinstein and Klein (1996) make it clear that unrealistic optimism is quite distinct from 





high self-esteem. Whilst self-esteem concerns only consideration of the self, unrealistic 
optimism is concerned with predictions of the future that take into account consideration of the 
self (Coehlo, 2010). Jefferson, Bortolotti and Kuzmanovic (2017) consider unrealistic 
optimism to be a cognitive state rather than a metacognition per se. They suggest that it is one 
of a number of ‘positive illusions’ that individuals hold, and, according to Shepperd, Klein, 
Waters and Weinstein (2013), it can be either comparative (involving outcome judgements in 
comparison to other individuals) or absolute (involving judgements about objective outcomes 
such as grade on an assessment). In either case, unrealistic optimism involves beliefs that are 
not convincingly evidenced and provide the person with a more positive outlook than is 
reasonable (Jefferson et al, 2017). This reliance on faulty predictions can be to an individual’s 
detriment – as Jefferson et al point out it can lead to them failing to take adequate action to 
avoid negative outcomes. 
Why does unrealistic optimism occur?  
Unrealistic optimism occurs for many events, but not all, and the extent to which it occurs 
differs drastically as well. However, Coelho (2010) notes this is because the situation or context 
determines unrealistic optimism. Aspects of the context influence the cognitive biases and 
motivational processes which individuals are prone to. Motivational processes are deliberate 
distortions of information by individuals which serve a specific purpose – predominantly the 
curation of self-esteem (Coelho, 2010). Cognitive biases include the illusion of control, the 
overestimation of small risks/underestimation of big risks and past experience (where lack of 
experience encourages optimism) (Coelho, 2010).   
Having considered the evidence for a variety of motivational processes and cognitive biases, 
Coelho (2020) concluded that both motivation and cognition explain unrealistic optimism and 





are perceived to be controllable. Secondly, there is a degree of commitment or emotional 
investment in the outcome (Weinstein, 1980). It is feasible that different contexts and situations 
are subject to variation in how they are perceived by different individuals and this may be a 
consequence of individual agency, structural factors or the interplay between them. However, 
it is argued that in the present context of an employability module, it is more likely than not 
that both of the necessary conditions for unrealistic optimism will be present.  
Firstly, higher education, by the second year of an HE degree (when this employability module 
takes place), is something that students are familiar with and as such they better understand the 
mechanisms within a university and have an increased sense of agency toward their degree(i.e. 
they have considerable past experience).  Our assertion of students feeling in control is further 
supported by the presence of human capital narratives woven throughout the educational 
landscape (Reay, 2017; Waller, Ingram & Ward, 2018) culminating in in the concept of 
“graduateness” (Tomlinson, 2007) where university students construct their graduate identity 
by amassing resources and skills required by the market.   While there are well documented 
structural barriers to graduates developing and using these resources (Burke, 2016; Clarke, 
2018; Crew, 2018) these structural barriers are not clear to all students (Burke, Scurry & 
Blenkinsopp, 2019). Undergraduates who have been inculcated via human capital narratives 
can manifest a strong sense of personal responsibility and the ability to develop the necessary 
skills to successfully enter the labour market.  They may believe these skills will be supported 
through the higher education curriculum alone (Harvey, 2005; Pegg, Waldock, Hendy-Isaac & 
Lawton, 2012) because they are more likely to equate the well documented meritocratic 
credentialism of qualifications (Burke, 2016) with skills development, rather than 
understanding that a good degree alone does not necessarily equip you with all the capital to 







Secondly, students are also likely to be emotionally and financially invested because the 
assessment on the module contributes to their final degree classification. Whilst there may be 
variations in the extent to which they believe they need to engage with the module activities in 
order to build employability, there is likely to be some degree of commitment to the outcome 
of obtaining a good grade.  
A third and final reason for this module being able to elicit unrealistic optimism is that 
successful performance is less dependent on academic or cognitive ability than a traditional 
business module such as finance, economics or management theory. This employability 
module is concerned with developing employability and career management skills, which are 
not wholly dependent on cognitive ability – academic skills may be important (e.g. Blaxell & 
Moore, 2012), but so might factors such as emotional intelligence (e.g. Coetzee & Beukes, 
2014), human capital aspects (skills, competencies and work experience, e.g. Clarke, 2018) 
and personality variables, adaptability and flexibility (e.g. Clarke, 2018). These are more likely 
to be perceived to be amenable to development, and therefore control, than cognitive ability. It 
is these contextual factors can lead to students holding unrealistically optimistic views about 
their ability to attain a high grade on the module with these unrealistic cognitions then 
impacting negatively on their actual performance and attainment as demonstrated by 
(Nicholson, Putwain, Connors & Hornby-Atkinson, 2013). 
Unrealistic Optimism and Counterfactual Reasoning 
Hoch (1985) attempted to understand how the phenomenon of unrealistic cognitions may be 
manipulated to improve accuracy of predictions about future personal events; this is important 
since having more realistic expectations is linked to achieving better outcomes (e.g. Nicholson 





months and who were beginning to search for jobs. Hoch presented them with personal events 
linked to their future jobs and asked them to make probability judgements about how likely 
they were to achieve them, for example: "What is the probability your starting salary will 
exceed XXX amount?" The difficulty of achieving the outcomes was varied amongst the 
participants, with 3 different levels of difficulty:  
• low base rate (very difficult to achieve, e.g. a very high starting salary) 
• medium base rate (moderately difficult to achieve) 
• high base rate (easier to achieve e.g. a low starting salary).  
Participants were also asked to generate reasons why they might (pro) or might not (con) 
achieve these outcomes. The experiment had four conditions for this: some participants 
produced no reasons (the control group), some produced only pro reasons (reasons why they 
might achieve the salary), some produced only con reasons (reasons why they might not 
achieve the salary) and some produced both pro and con reasons. Hoch used official records 
from the university as a measure of the actual outcomes achieved by the students and compared 
them to the probability judgements made earlier. Production of pro reasons lead to higher 
probability judgements about all the events i.e. the students felt they were more likely to 
achieve them, as compared to students who produced only con reasons. The students made 
more accurate predictions when the events were less desirable (i.e. high base rate events, for 
example a low starting salary) and when generating con reasons. There was also a significant 
difference between those who did and did not generate con reasons across the different base 
rates. Firstly, those who generated con reasons were equally accurate regardless of whether 
they were making predictions about achieving a high grade or not. However, those who did not 





from high, through medium to low. Students made more accurate predictions about their 
outcomes when they were: 
1. Making predictions about their ability to achieve easy outcomes (low grades) and  
2. When they generated con reasons (reasons why they might not achieve a grade), i.e. 
they engaged in counterfactual reasoning. 
Aims 
The present study combines and extends Weinstein’s (1980) and Hoch’s (1985) research. It 
aims to test the effects of using counterfactual reasoning on student performance and attainment 
in an employability module. It does this by:  
1. Establishing whether unrealistic optimism in prediction of ability to attain specific grades on 
portfolio assessment on an employability development module actually exists  
2. Examining whether counterfactual reasoning can be used to improve student performance 
and attainment on the module assessment. 
It was hypothesised that: 
1. The students would demonstrate both over confidence and unrealistic optimism in relation 
to their attainment on the assessment  
2. Generation of reasons why they might fail (con reasons) to attain good grades would improve 
predictive accuracy.  







The study used an experimental questionnaire design, the independent variables being: 
1. The base rate of attainment goals (high, medium and low) 
2. The kind of reasoning the participants were asked to generate – control group, pro, con 
and pro and con - in accordance with Hoch (1985).  
The high base rate refers to events that occur for  the majority of  subjects (e.g. achieving a 
pass or above grade) and the low base rates refers to events that occur for a minority of the 
subjects, for example achieving a very high grade.  
The dependent variables were: 
1. Unrealistic optimism 
2. Probability judgements 
3. Predictive accuracy 
4. Assessment grade  
The independent variables were randomly mixed throughout the group of participants and there 
was also a control group who were not asked to generate any kind of reasoning for their 
predictions. A paper questionnaire was used to assess unrealistic optimism levels and reasoning 
(Hoch, 1985; Hevey, French, Marteau & Sutton, 2009). 
Participants and module 
The final sample of the data which was analysed within this study consisted of 210 university 
Level 5 undergraduate students registered on business programmes - the final sample included 
85 female and 125 male participants all between the ages of 19-26 (mean age was 21.46). Sixty-
five percent of the students were British and the remaining 35% were from countries in Europe, 
Asia, North America and Africa. The students were studying a module designed to develop 





development of an action plan to achieve necessary skills and production of an application for 
an actual job. An employability module was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, performance 
on an employability development module, assessed through a portfolio, meets both  conditions 
Weinstein argued were necessary for unrealistic optimism to occur: that the events are 
perceived to be controllable and that there is a degree of commitment or emotional investment 
in the outcome. High performance on this kind of module is less related to innate academic 
ability and is more concerned with knowledge of the self therefore is more likely open to greater 
personal control. Performing well on the module not only feeds into degree classification, it 
also potentially feeds into employment after graduation; students are likely to be emotionally 
invested in these. 
Measures 
A questionnaire was used which included: 
1. Two predictive questions asking the participant how likely they would be to achieve a 
specific grade on the assessment compared to a typical student on a scale of 1 
(significantly less likely) to 7 (significantly more likely to). This assessed the 
participant’s unrealistic optimism. 
2. One question asking the participants to generate reasons why they might (pro) or might 
not (con) achieve the outcome  
3. Three questions relating to the probability of the events occurring on a scale of 0.0 
(absolutely will not occur) to 1.0 (absolutely will occur). These were the participants 
probability judgements  





a. Reflective discussion of the individual’s personality, aptitudes, skills, 
knowledge and career values, interests and opportunities 
b. A covering letter and completed application for a graduate level job of their 
choosing but which needed to align with their graduate self as discussed in the 
reflective discussion section 
c. An action plan detailing how they would gain the skills, qualifications, 
experience and knowledge to be able to move into their chosen job 
This was assessed using clear grading criteria which was available to the students in the module 
handbook. These grading criteria allow the grader to arrive at a final grade on a scale of 0 to 
100% where: 
• 0-39%: fail 
• 40-49%: 3rd grade 
• 50-59%: 2:2 grade 
• 60-74%: 2:1 grade 
• 75-100%: 1st class 
Procedure 
Early in the Autumn Semester (week two of lectures), level 5 business students who were 
undertaking the module were invited to participate in the research. The questionnaires, which 
varied on base rates and reason generation groups, were randomly assigned in the lecture. 
Participants filled in and returned the questionnaire, data was then collated and entered into 
SPSS. When assessments were completed, graded and externally moderated, the grades of the 






1. The students would demonstrate both over confidence and unrealistic optimism in relation 
to their attainment on the assessment  
Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviations for the measures of: 
• Unrealistic optimism (scale of 1 to 7 where 1 = significantly less likely and 7 = 
significantly more likely) 
• Probability judgements (scale of 0.0 to 1.0 where 0.0 = Absolutely will not occur and 
1.0 = absolutely will occur) 
• Actual performance scores for each assessment; the written element and then the oral 
element (scale of 0 to 100%) 
On average participants recorded optimism scores of 5.15 (out of 7) which indicates they 
believed they were more likely than others in their class to achieve the specified grade. Mean 
probability judgement score was .765 indicating a good degree of confidence that they would 
achieve the specified grade. Probability judgements were skewed towards the higher level with 
59 participants predicting they would absolutely achieve the grade specified, no participants 
predicting they absolutely would not achieve the grade specified and only 2 predicting that it 
wasn’t very likely. The overwhelming majority of students, regardless of whether the grade 
specified in their questionnaire was high, medium or low, felt they might achieve the grade. 
Mean assessment grade was 59.95, just under the cut-off grade for a 2/1 classification, however 
the SD was 13.85 indicating grades varied significantly around the mean (although both the 
median and mode = 60).  
Table 1 about here 
The predictive accuracy of the probability judgements was calculated using Hoch’s (1985) 





absolutely will occur) and whether or not the outcome was achieved (0.0 = did not occur and 
1.0 did occur) is calculated: 
Predictive judgment - outcome = predictive accuracy 
The resulting scores can therefore range from: 
• -1 = the student did not expect the outcome to occur, but it did 
• Through 0 = they did fully expect the outcome and they did achieve it 
• 1 = they did expect the outcome but did not achieve it 
Thus, predictive accuracy scores that are positive indicate the student did less well than they 
predicted, and a negative score indicates they did better than they predicted, whilst a score of 
0 indicates they did exactly as predicted. As table 1 shows, predictive accuracy for the 
assessment was close to accurate with a very slight bias towards students doing better than they 
predicted.  
For hypothesis 1 then students did indicate high scores on unrealistic optimism in relation to 
assessment grades and their probability judgements were also very positive. Unrealistic 
optimism did not vary by reason generation type (pro, con both pro and con, no reason). 
However, predictive accuracy across the sample was actually very good – although this might 
have been the result of generation of reasons influencing the grades attained. A one-way 
ANOVA to test for this did reveal that the grades of those who generated con reasons were 
significantly higher (63.9%) than those who generated no reasons (56.9%). 
2. Generation of reasons why they might fail (con reasons) to achieve good grades would 
improve predictive accuracy.  
The effect of base rate (high, medium and low) and reason generation (pro, con, pro & con, no 





between-groups analysis of variance (ANOVA). Recall that participants were randomly 
divided into three different base rates - low base rate (grade of 60% or higher), medium base 
rate (grade of 50% or higher) and high base rate (grade of 40% or higher). Mean scores across 
base rates and by reason generation type for probability judgements, actual grades and 
predictive accuracy are shown in Table 2.  For those students who were asked about the 
probability of achieving a grade of greater than 60%, probability judgements were highest for 
students who generate pro reasons and lowest for those who generated con reasons. For those 
in the medium base rate group (asked to make judgements about achieving 50% or higher) the 
highest judgements were made by those in the control group (who did not generate any 
reasons). Again, the lowest probability judgements were made by those who generate con 
reasons. For the high base rate group (those asked to make judgements about achieving 40% 
or higher) the highest probability judgements were made by those who generated con reasons. 
The lowest were made by those who generate no reasons. 
Table 2 about here 
For actual grades achieved, the students who achieved the highest grades, regardless of base 
rate, were those who generated con reasons. The lowest grade achievers differed in each base 
rate group; in the low base rate group it was those who did not generate any reasons (controls), 
in the medium base rate group it was those who generated pro reasons and in the high base rate 
group it was those who did not generate any reasons. 
Inferential statistical analyses 
Probability Judgements 
The differences in probability judgements and prediction accuracy described above were tested 





significantly different. The dependent variables were, in turn, probability judgements, grades 
and prediction accuracy. The two independent variables were base rate (three levels – high, 
medium, low) and reason generation (four levels – pro, con, pro & con, no reasons). 
 
Mean probability judgements by reason generation group and base rate are plotted in  
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here 
Results from the two way ANOVA examining the effect of base rate and reason generation on 
probability judgements revealed a significant main effect of base rate on probability judgement, 
F(2,211) = 13.24, p =.000. Partial eta squared = .116. This indicates a medium to large effect; 
(Pallant, 2010). Tukey HSD post hoc tests revealed that the low base rate group (M = .71, SD 
= .16) and the medium base rate group (M =.71, SD =.21) both had significantly lower 
probability judgements than the high base rate group (M = .87, SD =.19), p =.000. Thus, those 
who were asked to make judgements about achieving at least a grade of 60% or 50%  made 
lower probability judgements than those asked about achieving a grade of 40% or more.  
 
There was no main effect of reason generation on probability judgements but the interaction 
effect was significant, F(6,211) = 2.855, p = .011., partial eta squared = .079, indicating a small 
to medium effect size. As Figure 3 shows, the pattern of findings for participants in the low 
and medium base rate groups across reason generation groups is quite different to that for the 
participants in the high base rate group. Participants who were both high base rate and 
generated con reasons gave higher probability judgements regarding likelihood of achieving 
the grade than participants in the control, pro and both pro and con groups. However, for 
participants in the low and medium base rate groups the pattern of findings across reason 





gave lower probability judgements than in the other reason generation groups. These results 
suggest that base rate influenced probability judgements but that the form of this influence was 
dependent on the reason generation group of the participant. 
 
Predictive accuracy 
The means for predictive accuracy by reason generation and base rate are plotted in Figure 2. 
Recall that negative scores indicate the student did not predict the positive outcome (but did 
achieve it), 0 indicates the student achieved exactly what they predicted they would and 
positive scores indicate they expected a positive outcome but did not achieve it. 
Figure 2 about here 
For predictive accuracy there was a statistically significant main effect of base rate, F (2, 211) 
=9.94 p <.001 with a medium effect size (partial eta squared = .08). Post-hoc comparisons 
using Tukey HSD test showed that there was a significant difference between the high base 
rate group (M=.182, SD= .495) and the low base rate group (M=-.081, SD=.319) on predictive 
accuracy. It also indicated that the medium base rate group (M=-.118, SD= .413) differed 
significantly from the high base rate group on predictive accuracy. There was no significant 
difference between the medium base rate group and the low base rate group. The results show 
firstly that those in low base rate group had better predictive accuracy than those in the high 
and medium base rate groups. Secondly these results indicate that those in the low and medium 
base rate groups were more likely to underestimate their assessment grades (i.e. do better than 
predicted) than those in the high base rate group who were more likely to overestimate their 
grade (i.e. do less well than predicted). 
There was a statistically significant main effect of reason generation, F (2,211) =6.44 p <.001, 





test showed that there was a significant difference between the con reason generation group 
(M=-.170, SD=.396) and the control group (M=.088, SD=.436) on predictive accuracy. It also 
showed a significant difference between the con reason generation group and those in the group 
which generated both pro and con reasons (M=.117, SD=.460) on predictive accuracy. The pro 
reason generation group (M=-.071, SD=.367) did not significantly differ from any other group. 
These results show that those within the control group had better predictive accuracy, compared 
to those in the con reason generation group and those in the group which generated pro and con 
reasons.  However, whilst those in the con group technically had poorer predictive accuracy, 
this is because they underestimated how well they would do. Those in the pro group also had 
poorer predictive accuracy and this was because they overestimated how well they would do.   
The interaction effect between reason generation and base rate was not statistically 
significant, F (2, 211) =1.98 p >.05. 
To summarise, generation of reasons and base rate had an effect on predictive accuracy. Those 
in the con reason generation group and those within low and medium base rates recorded the 
lowest predictive accuracy because they significantly underestimated how well they would do. 
3. Generating con reasons would improve assessment grade 
A two-way between-groups ANOVA was also conducted to explore the effect of reason 
generation and base rate on assessment grade (results shown in Figure 3). The main effect of 
base rate did not reach statistical significance, F (2, 211) =.478, p >.05. There was a 
statistically significant main effect for reason generation, F (2, 211) =2.96, p <.05 however 
effect size was small (partial eta squared = .02).  





Post-hoc comparisons using Tukey HSD indicated that the mean assessment grade for the con 
reason generation group (M=63.95, SD=10.51) was significantly greater than the mean for the 
control group (M=56.85, SD=18.17). The post hoc tests also indicated the con reason 
generation group scored significantly higher assessment grades than the group which generated 
both pro and con reasons (M=57, SD=15.18). The pro reason generation group (M=59.65, 
SD=10.54) did not significantly differ from any other group. The interaction effect between 
reason generation and base rate was not statistically significant, F (2, 211) = 1.12, p >.05. The 
results suggest then that reason generation did have an effect on assessment grade with those 
in the con reason generation group performing significantly better than those in the group 
which generated both con and pro reasons. 
Discussion 
Participants revealed a tendency to demonstrate unrealistic optimism regarding assessment 
outcomes in the context of the employability module. However, generating reasons why they 
would, or would not, obtain specific grades on their assessment influenced their probability 
judgements and altered their ability to accurately predict how well they would perform. These 
findings are broadly in line with those of Hoch’s despite his research being conducted 35 years 
ago in the United States of America and using different outcome measures of employability. 
The study aimed to test three hypotheses: 
1. The students would demonstrate both over confidence and unrealistic optimism in relation 
to their attainment on assessments  
2. Generation of reasons why they might fail (con reasons) to achieve good grades would 
improve predictive accuracy.  





The results for hypothesis 1 showed that students did typically demonstrate over confidence 
and unrealistic optimism. Optimism in the control group was not typically warranted, these 
participants did less well than they predicted. The first hypothesis was therefore supported and 
these findings suggest firstly, that the students perceived assessment performance on the 
employability module to be controllable, and secondly, that there was emotional investment in 
the outcome – the two prerequisites for situations to elicit unrealistic optimism (Coelho, 2010). 
This has implications for HE staff involved in the delivery of employability modules where 
students may overestimate their employability and/or their capacity to demonstrate it in 
assessments. Without intervention, students may continue to ignore or underestimate the 
challenges and fail to perform at their predicted level. Two issues arise here that warrant further 
attention. Firstly, what factors, specifically, influence students in their assumptions regarding 
controllability in employability modules and how do these vary across different individual or 
societal differences? This is considered in more detail later. Secondly, do other, more academic 
modules also elicit unrealistic optimism or is it restricted to those modules which are less a 
function of cognitive ability and more dependent on skills which can be developed? 
The second hypothesis was also supported. Generating pro and/or con reasons effected the 
probability judgements students made and their predictive accuracy. It was hypothesised that 
generating con reasons would improve predictive accuracy. This hypothesis was partially 
supported; those who generated con reasons and made predictions about a low base rate grade 
(i.e. a grade of 60% or more) did show good predictive accuracy (it approached 0). However, 
those who generated pro reasons in the low base rate group also demonstrated improved 
predictive accuracy. Importantly though, predictive accuracy for con reason generation in the 
medium and low base rate groups was such that they underestimated how well they would 
perform (i.e. they did better than they expected).  Thus students who were asked to produce 





underestimated how well they would perform, but were more likely to have attained those high 
grades. 
It was not a surprising finding that students in the pro reason generation and low base rate 
group made high probability judgements - this was anticipated - however what was surprising 
was that these students ended up with good predictive accuracy because they performed well 
on the assessment. In Hoch's original study, generating pro reasons had no effect on accuracy 
of predictions. A potential explanation for this is individual differences in accuracy of 
prediction. Boud and Falchikov (1989) examined student’s ability to rate their own 
performance. They found that high performing students demonstrated more criticality and 
underestimated how well they had performed and low performing students overestimated not 
just how well they had performed but to a greater extent than the higher performers 
underestimated. More recently Lew, Alwis and Schmidt (2010) have shown that students with 
greater academic success previously were more able to accurately self-assess their 
performance. These studies, however, looked at student’s ability to self-assess academic work 
already done as opposed to accurately predict how well they will do on future assessments of 
employability which as previously stated is likely dependent upon different skills and abilities 
Nonetheless, there could be significant implications here in relation to the work readiness of 
students when they shift from education to life after graduation. If students are using previous 
educational success to predict successful future employment trajectories, there is not going to 
be the same predictive accuracy as when a student predicts performance on a piece of submitted 
coursework using performance on a previous module as a guide. Employment success is not 
(solely) a function of academic success and furthermore the prediction is not based on an 
assessment of performance on an activity already done – it is predicting performance on a yet 





The third and final hypothesis was that generating con reasons would improve grade 
performance since more realistic cognitions are associated with better performance (Nicholson 
et al, 2013). This hypothesis was supported. Those who generated con reasons performed 
significantly better than those in the control group. In generating the reasons why they might 
fail to achieve a good grade, these students may have flagged potential problems in advance. 
This advanced warning might cue approaches to circumventing these problems before they 
arise. 
Implications 
These findings offer further evidence that students are unrealistically optimistic regarding their 
future performance and attainment on employability modules which has two negative 
consequences for them: firstly, they do not develop employability skills to the level they might, 
and secondly, it impacts upon their overall degree classification. However, the findings here 
also suggest that engaging students in counterfactual reasoning at the start of term can mitigate 
the effects of unrealistic optimism. Generating reasons why they might not achieve a good 
grade actually serves to protect them from this happening.  
While this paper has been considering these process at an individual level, it is also important to 
consider the implications of this research within the context of structural inequalities.  We suggest that 
these findings have particular implications for widening participation students.  The high levels of 
unrealistic optimism found in this cohort can be problematic for students who do not have resources or 
capitals to employ in order to soften the transition to an objective reality at odds with an individual’s 
subjective expectation.  Previously, Burke et al. (2019) have illustrated classed levels of understanding 
of the graduate labour market due to generational experience.  This gap in understanding the labour 
market, the authors continue, may be further exacerbated through unrealistic optimism.  Returning to 
Coelho (2020), unrealistic optimism is facilitated when there is investment in an outcome of an action, 





increased life chances.  In addition to personal investment, Coelho also identifies a sense of control in 
facilitating unrealistic optimism.  The human capital narratives running through higher education 
discourse and policy resonate with widening participation students in that it charts a meritocratic 
trajectory and offers a sense of control: investing in yourself.  Educational success and entry into higher 
education through “educational capital” provides a buffer between individuals and the harsher 
conditions/relations within a context or field.  Upon graduation, their future pathways and 
employability will be driven by a complex amalgam of individual attributes, capitals and 
market conditions (Burke, 2016; Clarke, 2018) which are not equal across different social 
classes and backgrounds. 
To further unpack findings reporting that participants with lower levels of optimism achieved higher 
modular performance, we draw on Markus & Nurius’ (1986) concept of Possible Selves and in 
particular Oyserman et al. (2006) concept of plausible possible selves.  Markus and Nurius explain that 
possible selves ‘represent individuals' ideas of what they might become, what they would like 
to become and what they are afraid of becoming...’ (1986, pp. 954) and as such can serve as a 
theoretical link between cognitions and motivation They represent a form of self-knowledge 
derived from past experiences creating a series of potential possible selves, both desirable and 
undesirable.   
The possibility of an undesirable possible self can be a significant influence.  Individuals who have 
balanced possible selves - a possible self they are working towards and a possible self they fear 
(i.e. are trying to avoid) - demonstrate greater self-regulatory effort because they then have 
behavioural strategies which support movement towards the desired possible self and 
movement away from the feared possible self (Oyserman & Markus, 1990). Individuals will 
commit more effort to attainment of a possible self when it is balanced and when it contains 
behavioural strategies for obtaining it (Oyserman, Bybee & Terry, 2006; Oyserman, Bybee, 





regulatory control over behaviour and it has been shown that possible selves which are 
underpinned by behavioural strategies (which facilitate achievement of underlying actions 
needed to achieve the possible self) are more likely to be realised (Oyserman et al, 2006).   
When possible selves are underpinned by these behavioural strategies they become 'plausible' 
possible selves (Oyserman et al, 2006). Plausibility affords automatic cuing of behavioural 
strategies which results in measurably different outcomes - Oyserman et al (2004) have shown 
that students who held plausible possible selves were able to improve grades over the course 
of an academic year whereas students who only held possible selves were not. Engaging in 
counterfactual reasoning should highlight the difficulties that students might face in doing well 
on an assessment, prompting them to consider behavioural strategies to overcome them and 
thereby supporting achievement of a possible self which involves attainment on the module 
(Oyserman et al, 2004).  It is possible then that in the present study, due to an individual’s 
expectation of a less desirable possible self being conjured by counterfactual reasoning, 
behavioural strategies were put in place to augment action to increase the potential for an 
alternative possible self, a more desirable future.  In the context of this study, rather than 
behaviour strategies simply leading to increased attainment they also lead to increased career 
readiness.   
Returning to widening participation, Scurry et al. (2020) discuss the friction between 
‘maintaining the promise without killing the dream’ of higher education, in other words the 
need to support individuals as they invest in their human capital but also not allow students to 
assume that the labour market is inherently meritocratic.  This dual process, the authors argue, 
will provide students with an accurate understanding of the labour market and inform their 
undergraduate strategies. Harrison (2018), in his application of the theory of possible selves to 
the widening participation agenda, makes explicit Crawford (2014) and Crawford and Greaves 





at 16. If counterfactual reasoning could be employed within schools then all learners, regardless 
of background, may be able to increase levels of attainment.  Further to this, in terms of career 
planning, counterfactual reasoning can provide a reflexive rebuttal to the dominant human 
capital narrative and create bespoke future plans and strategies to meet an individual’s goal. 
Limitations 
In the present study previous academic ability or self-perceived employability were not 
controlled for and both may play some role in probability judgements, predictive accuracy and 
assessment performance (see for example Newman-Ford et al, 2009). Whilst the module and 
the assessment here concern themselves less with academic ability and more with 
employability, academic ability could influence the construction and presentation of the 
portfolio. Differences in employability, such as self-awareness, might also be important for 
this. The present study did not consider the nature of the reasons generated nor whether students 
had relevant possible selves or behavioural strategies.  
Further Research  
Replications of this study should control for previous academic performance and self-
perceptions of employability in order to explore the impact these have on probability 
judgements, performance and predictive accuracy.  
In order to test the hypothesis that engaging with counterfactual reasoning might facilitate 
behavioural strategies and help the fulfilment of possible selves, a next step would be to 
identify the possible selves students have regarding their degrees and employability and what, 
if any, behavioural strategies they have to facilitate the attainment of them. To continue the 
experimental nature of the research, it would be beneficial to explore the impact of asking 





In relation to this it would be interesting to explore whether there are gender differences in goal 
setting and strategy formation. Pirmohamed, Debowska and Boduszek (2017) found 
differences in the extent to which goal setting and self-efficacy were able to predict 
achievement. For males, significant predictors were study time, active learning strategies and 
performance goals predicted male’s achievement, but only self-efficacy predicted female’s 
achievement. 
One final approach to furthering this area of study would be to explore the suitability of 
counterfactual reasoning on increasing attainment across other types of modules. Unrealistic 
optimism is more likely to arise when individuals feel they have a high degree of personal 
control over the outcome and it would be interesting to see the extent to which this is the case 
for modules of a more academic nature. Should there be unrealistic optimism for more 
academic modules then the application of counterfactual reasoning and the development of 
behavioural strategies for movement towards desired possible selves and away from feared 
possible selves could be a valuable tool in a much broader range of education settings. 
Conclusions 
Improved degree classifications and employability are beneficial to students and HE institutes, 
however, students can and do hold unrealistic cognitions about their ability to perform well. 
This study suggests that engaging students in counterfactual reasoning regarding their 
performance on an employability portfolio assessment influences what they believe probable 
regarding their performance. It is posited that this may occur via the notion of possible selves 
which provide a link between cognition and motivation, and between motivation and volition, 
through what are variously referred to as behavioural strategies. Generating con reasons may 
prompt individuals to consider possible and feared selves and begin the formation of 





classes, starting work on assessments earlier or engaging with formative feedback. Further 
research is needed to verify this and to explore the feasibility of using counterfactual reasoning 
in a broader range of educational settings, however, this work, which extends Hoch's work 
from the 1980's, holds clear implications for students and tutors in HE: students can improve 
their performance and attainment on employability modules by explicitly recounting the 
barriers they perceive to that performance. 
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